persönliche identität definition
As it turns out, however, there may be good reasons to deny both the intrinsicness and the determinacy of personal identity (cf. 3.a. Sie notieren Assoziationen zum Begriff „Identität“ und erarbeiten, was transgeschlechtlich bedeutet. X’s brain is removed from X’s body and X’s body is destroyed. Hence, it is implausible to believe that such a borderline exists. One of the problems with this suggestion is that it assumes that personal identity is an extrinsic relation. In distinguishing those changes in a person that constitute survival from those changes in a person that constitute death, a criterion of personal identity through time is given. This makes the label Identity Mysticism (“IM“) most appropriate (cf. 180-201, Butler, Joseph (1736), “Of Personal Identity,” First Dissertation to, Campbell, John (1992), “The First Person: The Reductionist View of the Self,” in Charles & Lennon eds. These commentators typically complement their psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest continuer clause. Defenders of the somatic approach, most notably Olson and Snowdon, have tried to shift the focus to real-life cases in which descriptions along physiological lines look much more promising. One version is that personal identity is non-reductive and wholly non-informative, denying that personal identity follows from anything other than itself. (1971b), On “The Importance of Self-Identity”,”, Parfit, Derek A. 91-107, Parfit, Derek A. Goffman 1967): 2.1.1 Soziale Identität; 2.1.2 Persönliche Identität; 2.1.3 Ich-Identität; 3 Quellenverzeichnis Physiological approaches have consequences many of us feel uncomfortable with. Martin, Raymond & Barresi, John eds. Nowadays, the Simple View is disparaged as a theory only maintained by thinkers whose religious or spiritual commitments outweigh the reasons that speak against their views on personal identity. Identity Mysticism plays only an indirect role in contemporary personal identity theory. The Narrow version, we may note, is logically equivalent to the Physical Criterion. NEWSCHOOL New School, die Sendung von Kindern für Kinder, ist diesmal an der Grundschule am Wilhelmsberg. Parfit 1984). (1987), “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons,” in Blakemore & Greenfield eds. Jahrhundert. McDowell 1997; Wittgenstein 1922, 3.263). Selbstdefinition als einzigartiges und unverwechselbares Individuum, die auf einer interpersonalen (oder intragruppalen) Differenzierung auf der Basis individueller Merkmale beruht („ich“ vs. „du“ oder „ihr“) sozialen Identität What does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist in? I cannot reveal the identity of … This contention may contradict our intuitions more than any thought experiment could. (1992), pp. Opponents of the psychological criterion typically favour a physiological approach. b : the relation established by psychological identification. In fact, however, the opposite is the case: the appeal to physiology introduces an unacceptable element of contingency into the answers to the persistence question envisaged by defenders of these criteria. (2003), pp. The information is sent to a replicator device on Mars, which at t2 creates a qualitatively identical duplicate, Y (cf. Shoemaker 1970). By congruence, however, they are not identical with each other: Y1 and Y2 share many properties, but even at the very time the fission operation is completed differ with regards to others, such as spatio-temporal location. 4.1.2 Teilidentitäten und multiple Identitäten 4.1.3 Das Identitätsgefühl Many translated example sentences containing "persönliche Angaben" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. ... len Identität unter dem Eindruck einer "Bedrohung". Therefore, by modus tollens, if X is not determinately identical with Y, X is not identical with Y (cf. Collaborative Dictionary German-English, You want to reject this entry: please give us your comments (bad translation/definition, duplicate entries...), Free: Learn English, French and other languages, Reverso Documents: translate your documents online, Learn English watching your favourite videos, All German-English translations from our dictionary, Die Musik wird rhythmusorientiert und meine ganz, The music will be rhythmically-oriented and will be my very, Doch diese Erkenntnis verlieren wir, wenn wir zuviel über unsere, Yet we lose this revelation when we worry over much about our. These adventures do not have to be theoretically as fancy as the cases, to be discussed later, of human fission or brain swaps: a theory of personal identity tells us whether we can live through the acquisition of complex cognitive capacities in our development from fetus to person, or whether we have survived car accidents if we find ourselves in a persistent vegetative state. : Die persönliche Identität, während immaterielle, ist wichtig. Consequently, should appeal to such scenarios as Teletransportation be acceptable and should the intuition above be widely shared, the brain criterion and physical criterion are false. Even though this so-called Simple View satisfies certain religious or spiritual predilections, it faces metaphysical and epistemological obstacles, as we shall see. As a result, most commentators accept 6 but choose to accept a particular criterion in the vicinity of either side of the psychology-physiology divide. You can complete the translation of persönliche Identität given by the German-English Collins dictionary with other dictionaries: Wikipedia, Lexilogos, Langenscheidt, Duden, Wissen, Oxford, Collins dictionaries... German-English dictionary : translate German words into English with online dictionaries. Identität bezeichnet eine Gesamtheit von diversen Selbstbildern, die von Zugehörigen einer Gesellschaft, Kultur oder Organisation erlebt wird. C: from B, 4: The psychological approach is false. also 2.d.). Since the psychological and physiological approaches are mutually exclusive and, we may suppose in the current context, as candidates for an adequate theory of personal identity jointly exhaustive, any objection against the psychological approach is equally an argument for the physiological approach. Suppose further that the resulting being Z is psychologically continuous with X. From this it follows that. Consider the following thought experiment: X’s brain is transplanted into Y’s body. While many commentators regard the appeal to quasi-memory, and ultimately “quasi-psychology,” as sufficient to solve the circularity problem, some commentators think that personal concepts infiltrate extensionally articulated psychological concept-systems so deeply that any reductionist programme in personal identity is doomed from the start (cf. Alleged conclusion: personal identity is indeterminate. (1971a), “Personal Identity,”, Parfit, Derek A. It is not obvious that there is a straightforward relation between them, for everything depends on how the notions of “functioning human body” and “life-sustaining organs” are understood. Since it is determinate that X is identical with X, under the assumption that congruence and predicate logic apply, X must be determinately identical with Y. Premise 3 seems to be obvious, because its being false would entail that one and the same being can outlive itself, which is absurd. According to this general stance, either both psychological and physiological continuity relations are fully reducible to a domain in which physical explanations are couched, perhaps in terms of the basic elements of a final and unified theory of physics, or they belong themselves to such a domain. This is due to the fact that it is assumed that a theory of personal identity cannot be weakly reductive without involving appeal to discredited spiritual substances or committing itself either to the acknowledgment of yet unrecognized physical entities or to an Identity Mysticism on the level of persons. (1995). The being Y that is transported to the hospital is at t2 in a persistent vegetative state. Request full-text PDF. (1995), pp. (b) One could deny premise 2 instead, arguing that if personal identity is indeterminate, then our preferred criterion of personal identity does not have to deliver verdicts in all thought-experimental scenarios. There is no single problem of personal identity, but rather a widerange of questions that are at best loosely connected. Authors: Christian Neuhäuser. (1976), “Lewis, Perry, and What Matters,” in Rorty ed. Grasp of the notion of numerical identity, to be sure, is essential to our ability to distinguish between the events of picking out one thing more often than once and picking out more than one thing. The need for the distinction between authentic and inauthentic reductions arises due to an equivocation that ought not to confuse the present discussion: reductionisms in personal identity theory often take forms, if regarded for example as sets of supervenience claims, that are deemed, in other areas of analytic philosophy, as distinctively non-reductionist. ); (iii) that what prudentially matters in survival is psychological continuity; (iv) that personal identity relations must respect the remaining formal properties of identity. Begriff Identität läßt sich als die Antwort auf die Frage verstehen, wer man selbst oder wer jemand anderer sei.Identität im psychologischen Sinne beantwortet die Frage nach den Bedingungen, die eine lebensgeschichtliche und situationsübergreifende Gleichheit in der Wahrnehmung der eigenen Person möglich machen (innere Einheitlichkeit trotz äußerer Wandlungen). With Reverso you can find the German translation, definition or synonym for persönliche Identität and thousands of other words. Some commentators have attempted to save the psychological approach by appeal to the so-called “multiple occupancy view,” that is, the claim that, despite appearances, X was two people, namely Y1 and Y2, all along (cf. Let us speak of authentic reductions if the ontological status of members of the reduced category is, in a way to be made precise, diminished in favor of the allegedly “more fundamental” existence-status of members of the reducing category. Zurück zur Übersicht. In the latter case, a “closest continuer” clause and/or a “no-branching” proviso must complement a psychological continuity analysis (For a development of this case, see Nozick 1981; Parfit 1984; and Wiggins 1967). How is the Paradox to be resolved? Premise 3: Personal identity relations are factual: criteria of personal identity are determined neither by conventions, norms, or other social or personal preferences, however basic, nor by analytic matters about the meaning of concepts. Furthermore, in those cases in which they are not, for example Body Swap, Human Vegetable, and Fetus, appeal to indeterminacy does little to remove the contradictory intuitions that these cases trigger. This gives a distinctive sense to the claim that a criterion of personal identity is to be constitutive, not merely evidential: in order for a relation R to be constitutive for personal identity, it must be the case that, necessarily, if some past or future Y stands in an R-relation to X, then X is identical with Y. The fear underlying the Paradox of Personal Identity, then, is that there may be no metaphysical fact to the matter as to whether the antecedently specifiable differences between human beings and other organic or inorganic material objects count as sufficient in order for us to have persistence conditions different from these objects. Consequently, unless one holds that personal identity is categorically indeterminate whenever the physiological and psychological features of a human being come apart, appeal to indeterminacy cannot establish the rejection of the Big Assumption in such a way as to avoid the Paradox’s conclusion. (1997), pp. Persönliche Annäherung 2. What defines our personality, character, and identity? lelicoidale.eu. Collect a few possible answers and ask yourself whether the resulting being, the freshly created being that is now a candidate for being identical with you before you died, is in fact you. Die Musik wird rhythmusorientiert und meine ganz persönliche Identität sein. It does not seem as if any possible thought experiment, irrespectively of how unequivocal our intuitions about it, could redeem this fear. Should fission be an acceptable scenario, it presents problems for the the psychological approach in particular. personale Identität . One of the main problems a psychological approach faces is overcoming an alleged circularity associated with explicating personal identity relations in terms of psychological notions. Premise 2 is implied by the psychological approach. However, since these are clearly substantial questions about our persistence, we should not consider ourselves justified to settle the matter by definition. Sie sehen einen Ausschnitt aus dem Dokumentarfilm „Mäd-chenseele“ und diskutieren über den Unterschied zwischen This move has the further benefit that we do not have to quarrel with the alleged conclusion of another thought experiment, the combined spectrum: A spectrum of possible cases is imagined: at the near end, the normal case, X at t1 is fully psychologically and physiologically continuous with Y at t2, while at the far end X at t1 is neither psychologically nor physiologically continuous with Y at t2. Wer bin ich? Consequently, the objection goes, if memory and other psychological predicates are not impartial with regards to identity judgments, a theory that involves these predicates and that at the same time proposes to explicate such identity judgments is straightforwardly circular: it plainly assumes what it intends to prove. Forschungsverlauf und Methode 3.1 Problemstellung und Untersuchungsgebiet 3.2 Zugang, Forschungsverlauf und Methoden 4. Assume, for reductio, that personal identity consists in direct memory connections. Alleged conclusion: all views which postulate psychological continuity as a necessary condition are false. The defender of the Psychological Criterion must hold that we are not identical with a past fetus or infant, and that we will not have survived if fallen into a persistent vegetative state. who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others: The man's identity was being kept secret while he was helping police with enquiries. Our alleged intuition: Each of us is identical with a past fetus. We could avoid this problem by adding a closest-continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that the best candidate for survival in a fission scenario, that is, the fission outcome which bears the most or the most important resemblances to the original person X, is identical with X. (1995), “The Unimportance of Identity,” in Harris ed. We can further distinguish between three versions of the psychological criterion: the Narrow version demands psychological continuity to be caused “normally,” the Wide version permits any reliable cause, and the Widest version allows any cause to be sufficient to secure psychological continuity (cf. The dialectic of such thought experiments, however, requires that a description of the scenario is possible that does not presuppose the identity of the participants in question. Can one really become two? Blog. The same is true of persons, who are constituted by, but not identical with, a physiology, a psychology, and the occurrence of an interrelated series of causal and cognitive relations. This argument may be referred to as the Paradox of Personal Identity. A criterion of personal identity tells us what our persistence necessarily consists in, which means that it must be able to deliver a verdict in possible scenarios that is consistent with its verdicts in ordinary cases. A: from 1, 2: A criterion of personal identity determines for every possible past event e0 and future event e2, within the boundaries of an adequate delineation of the modality in question, whether a person X at t1 is identical with the being that has participated in e0 and the being that will participated in e2. The system of claim 1 wherein the vehicle data further includes identification codes and priority codes. 71-86, Snowdon, Paul F (1996), “Persons and Personal Identity,” in Lovibond & Williams (1996), pp. Although the lump of bronze and the statue itself surely exist, these objects have different persistence conditions: if melted down, Venus ceases to exist while the lump of bronze does not. The problem with this strategy is that, if accepted, we seem to be unable to decide on a criterion of personal identity on the basis of intuitions at all, on pain of unjustifiably favoring one’s own over other people’s intuitions. The concept of identity is uniquely defined by (a) the logical laws of congruence: if X is identical with Y, then all non-relational properties borne by X are borne by Y, or formally “∀(x, y)[(x = y) → (Fx = Fy)]; and (b) reflexivity: every X is identical with itself, or formally “∀x(x = x). Other sources 45-59, Johnston, Mark (1992), “Constitution Is Not Identity,”, Johnston, Mark (1997), “Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves,” in Dancy ed. Now, how does this relate to the fission case? Noonan 1989; Wiggins 2001). The problem is that human beings are organic material objects, the persistence of which is determined by these objects’ following a continuous trajectory between space-time points. The question of whether or not physically impossible but logically possible scenarios are acceptable remains to be answered. Although this view is still somewhat unpopular, developments about personal identity theory in the 1990s promise an ideological change, as versions of the so-called somatic criterion, associated with Eric Olson and Paul Snowdon, attract a continuously growing number of adherents. …the supernatural being could have given you a body which bears no physical continuity or causal relation to the one you possessed before your death, or that it could have resurrected you, in some sense or other, as a bodiless being? In fact, Descartes’ own view that personal identity is determined by “vital union” relations between pure Egos and bodies, with the persistence of the Ego being regarded as sufficient for the persistence of the person but the person not being wholly identifiable with the Ego, could be a weakly reductive view of persons. Heiner Keupp. Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections. Shoemaker, Sidney & Swinburne, Richard (1984), Snowdon, Paul F. (1991), “Personal Identity and Brain Transplants,” in Cockburn ed. This proviso avoids the problem of violating the transitivity of identity. (1995). Premise 3: Psychological continuity cannot at the same time be (i) necessary and/or sufficient for a thing’s persistence and (ii) neither necessary nor sufficient for the same thing’s persistence. Also called: identity element. How does one’s identity develop over time? Defenders of bodily criterion and somatic criterion typically bite the bullet and argue that it is not the case that X and Y have swapped bodies, but that Y falsely believes to be X, and therefore that Z is identical with Y. idem, derselbe, der gleiche) die ihn kennzeichnende und als Individuum von anderen Menschen unterscheidende Eigentümlichkeit seines Wesens.Analog wird der Begriff auch zur Charakterisierung von abgrenzbaren Entitäten verwandt. One scenario that has been widely debated is the following: At t1, X enters a teletransporter, which, before destroying X, creates an exact blueprint of X’s physical and psychological states. …the question of whether or not the resulting person is you depends on the existence, in the resurrected person, of something that one might call “a soul”? Parfit 1984). IDENTITÁTE (< fr., lat.) Identität Sozialkognitive Modelle Facetten des Selbstkonz 4 Identitätsformen Geschlechtsidentität Sexuelle Orientierung Akkulturationsstrategie Identitätsentwicklung Selbst & Selbstkonzept Definition Identität Agenda Selbst Selbstkonzept "Wer bin ich?" Translate texts with the world's best machine translation technology, developed by the creators of Linguee. Theoretischer Bezugsrahmen 4.1 Begriff der Identität 4.1.1 Was ist Identität(sarbeit), Wozu Identität? (1991), pp. One should refrain from drawing precipitate conclusions from its defining characteristic as a paradox, that is, the fact that denying any of its premises leads to a conclusion that either violates our intuitions or, in the case of 4, 5, and C, commits one to a philosophically disreputable stance. There are two main contenders, physiological continuity-relations and psychological continuity-relations, which will be discussed in turn. Consequently, fission cases seem to show that the psychological approach entails that a thing could be identical with two non-identical things, which of course violates the transitivity of identity. : System von Anspruch 1, wobei die Fahrzeugdaten ferner Identifikationscodes und Prioritätscodes enthalten. (1995), pp. 2. identity - the individual characteristics by which a thing or person is recognized or known; "geneticists only recently discovered the identity of the gene that causes it"; "it was too dark to determine his identity"; "she guessed the identity of his lover".
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